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This paper presents a simple agency model to explain why third-party income reporting by employers
dramatically improves income tax enforcement. Modern firms have a large number of employees and
carry out complex production tasks, which requires the use of accurate business records. Because such
records are widely used within the firm, any single employee can denounce collusive tax cheating
between employees and the employer by revealing the true records to the government. We show that,
if a firm is large enough, such whistleblowing threats will make tax enforcement successful even with
low penalties and low audit rates. Embedding this agency model into the standard Allingham-Sandmo
tax evasion model, we show that third-party reporting improves tax enforcement if the government
disallows self-reported losses or audits such losses more stringently, which fits with actual tax policy
practices. We also embed the agency model into a simple macroeconomic growth model where the
size of firms grows with exogenous technological progress. In early stages of development, firms are
small, tax rates are severely constrained by enforcement, and the size of government is too small. As
firm size increases, the enforcement constraint is slackened, and government size is growing. In late
stages of development, firm size is sufficiently large to make third-party tax enforcement completely
effective and government size is socially optimal.
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The size of governments has expanded dramatically over the 20th century. A central element of
this expansion has been the ability of governments to extract a substantial fraction of national
products through taxation without destroying economic growth. In all advanced economies,
most taxes are collected through third-party institutions such as private or public employers,
banks, investment funds, and pension funds. These entities (which we call \rms") generally
have a large number of employees, clients, or business partners. Therefore, they need to use
accurate and rigorous records to carry out their complex business activities. Firms report taxable
income|such as corporate prots, compensation paid to employees, or capital income paid to
clients|directly to the government, and therefore act as a third party between households
and the government. They also often withhold taxes on behalf of the government so that tax
payments take place \as-you-go".1
It is widely known in the tax law literature (e.g., Surrey 1958; Lederman 2009) as well as
among tax practitioners (e.g., Bird 2003; OECD 2004, 2006) that tax enforcement is excellent
whenever such third-party reporting is in place, and that enforcement is weak|even in the most
advanced economies|when such third-party reporting is not in place, as in the case of small
family businesses. Therefore, as a rst approximation, tax enforcement is successful if and only
if third-party reporting covers a large fraction of taxable income. For example, the most recent
US Tax Compliance Measurement Study (Internal Revenue Service, 2006) shows that individual
income tax evasion rates is 53.9% when there is \little or no" information reporting, but that
the evasion rate is less than 5% when there is substantial information reporting.2
In spite of its central importance, the theoretical literature on tax evasion has not devoted
much attention to the issue of third-party reporting or tried to explain why such a system is
successful. Indeed, most of the modern literature on tax evasion follows on the seminal study
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), which used the Becker (1968) model of crime and focuses on
a situation with no third-party reporting, i.e., on the case where enforcement is never successful
1The withholding system is useful to individuals or companies when there are credit constraints, a point we
will not investigate in this paper where we focus only on informational aspects.
2Similarly, Kleven et al. (2009) study an income tax audit experiment in Denmark and nd that, although
purely self-reported income constitutes only about 8% of total reported income, it accounts for about 90% of
detected evasion. Eurostat (2007) uses a questionnaire on undeclared work in the European Union and shows
that it is concentrated primarily among the self-employed providing direct services to households.
1in practice and which covers a minor part of taxation in advanced economies.3 The Allingham-
Sandmo model generates a key puzzle: why are compliance rates so high in developed countries
given that audit rates and penalties for tax evasion are generally very low?4
Our paper sets out a three-tiered agency model to provide a simple micro-foundation for the
success of third-party reporting. In the model, the government is the top tier (principal) trying
to extract tax revenue from individual income earners (bottom tier agents) who are employed
or paid by rms (middle tier). The rm acts as a third party that reports income on behalf
of individuals. Although we focus on the case where individuals are employees of the rm, the
model can easily be applied to a situation where individuals are clients investing their savings
and receiving capital income from a nancial institution, or shareholders receiving prots from
the rm. When a rm is large and complex, using detailed business records|such as accounting
books, details of purchases and sales, or payroll accounts listing individual wages and salaries|
is extremely valuable for productivity. Such records are widely used within the rm and hence
many employees know about them.
In principle, the rm and its employees could collude to report smaller incomes|salaries and
prots|to the government than those actually earned. Under perfect information and commit-
ment between the rm and individuals, there would be no reason for breaking the collusion. In
practice, breakdowns can occur because of random shocks such as conicts between employees
and the employer, moral concerns of a newly hired employee, or an employee mistakenly showing
the true business records to tax inspectors. Breakdowns can also occur as a result of rational
whistleblowing if the government provides rewards to whistleblowers and rms cannot make
employees commit not to whistleblow ex-ante. In our model, we assume that each employee has
the option of reporting cheating to the government by divulging the true business records to the
government. When a rm has many employees, breakdowns of collusion will occur with a high
probability. Critically, it is the combination of a large number of informed employees and the
existence of business records evidence, which makes third-party tax enforcement successful.5
3See Andreoni et al. (1998), Cowell (1990), Schneider and Enste (2000), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002),
Slemrod (2007), and Shaw, Slemrod, and Whiting (2008) for comprehensive surveys.
4As Andreoni et al. (1998) conclude at the end of their survey (p. 855): \The most signicant discrepancy
that has been documented between the standard economic model of compliance and real-world compliance
behavior is that the theoretical model greatly over-predicts noncompliance." Various studies suggest that high
compliance rates may be explained by psychological or behavioral aspects such as social norms, tax morale,
patriotism, guilt and shame (e.g., Cowell 1990, chapter 6; Andreoni et al. 1998, Section 8). In this paper, we
propose instead a theory explaining high compliance based on information.
5Our model focuses on internal information sharing within the rm. However, rms also share information
2We embed this agency model into the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of tax eva-
sion assuming that some income items (such as wages and salaries) are third-party reported,
while other income items are solely self-reported (such as self-employment income). We rst
demonstrate a surprising third-party irrelevance result: even if the government can observe
third-party reported items perfectly at no cost, third-party reporting will be entirely undone by
individual tax lers who adjust self-reported income correspondingly. However, this irrelevance
result depends critically on two assumptions: self-reported losses are allowed and audit rates
are independent of the level (or sign) of self-reported income. In practice, self-reported income
losses are often disallowed to count against other income items, and tax audits are concentrated
on self-reported income and especially self-reported income losses. In those circumstances, the
irrelevance result no longer holds and third-party reporting does reduce overall tax evasion.
The last part of the paper embeds our agency model into a simple macroeconomic growth
model where the size and complexity of rms grows with exogenous technological progress.
In this model, a representative individual has preferences over private and public goods. In
the absence of enforcement problems, taxes are non-distortionary and should be set to nance
public goods according to the classical Samuelson rule. We model utility functions such that
the public good has an income elasticity equal to one, implying that the rst-best tax rate
is constant along the path of economic growth. With tax enforcement constraints, however,
there are three regimes over the process of development. In the earliest stage, rms are very
small and untaxable, and therefore the government raises no tax revenue and supplies no public
goods. In the middle stage, rm size is large enough that rms start becoming taxable provided
that the tax rate is not too high. In that stage, the enforcement constraint is binding, and
the government tax rate and public goods provision are below the rst-best level but growing
over time. In the latest stage, rms have become so large that, even under the rst-best tax
rate, rms choose to remain in the formal sector and pay taxes. The government imposes the
rst-best tax rate and government size relative to output is optimal and stable over time.6
This simple macro model can account for the historical growth in government size over the
with external parties such as other businesses and individual clients, shareholders, or debt holders. The number
of such external parties also grows with economic development, making tax collusion more dicult as in our
internal information sharing model.
6Although we present the theory in the context of a benevolent government maximizing the welfare of a
representative household, the story is consistent with a Leviathan view of government where self-interested
politician-bureaucrats maximize tax revenue.
3last century and the stability of government size since the 1970s in the richest economies. The
theoretical story does not rely on demand for public goods eects or political economy eects.
Our theory shows that technological progress and economic growth leads to large and complex
rms, which can then be easily taxed. Therefore, our theory shows that capitalism|in the
sense of the emergence of large and complex rms using rigorous accounting|is a necessary
condition for the rise of large welfare state governments, which fund public programs such as
welfare programs, social insurance programs, retirement benets, and education. This can be
seen as a Marxist theory in minor mode: rather than leading to revolution and communism,
capitalism, by relaxing the tax enforcement constraint, breads large welfare states.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literatures. Section 3
presents our micro-model of third-party tax enforcement and then embeds this model into a
standard Allingham-Sandmo model of tax evasion. Section 4 embeds the micro-model in a
simple macroeconomic framework which accounts for the evolution of government size over the
course of development. Finally, Section 5 oers concluding remarks.
2 Review of Related Literature
2.1 Literature on Tax Evasion and Tax Enforcement
Our agency model of third-party tax enforcement contributes to the large literature on tax
evasion and tax enforcement. A few previous studies have incorporated information reporting
into tax evasion models. Yaniv (1992) made the simple but important point that, if the employer
and employees can collude, then third-party reporting cannot help tax enforcement. Our paper
starts from this benchmark and shows that this collusion equilibrium is fragile in the presence
of veriable business records and many employees.
Recently, a number of studies have made important progress in modelling the problem of
tax enforcement. First, Gordon and Li (2005) develop a model where the government can
collect taxes only from formal rms dened as those connected to the nancial sector. Access to
credit is indeed one way in which using rigorous accounting books improves productivity. They
show how the lessons from optimal tax theory are drastically changed in this environment and
t much better with actual tax policies. Instead of considering a reduced-form model of tax
enforcement, our paper zooms in on the micro-foundations of third-party reporting by explicitly
modelling the tax evasion game in a three-tiered agency model and is fully consistent with the
4contribution of Gordon and Li (2005). Second, Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006) set out a simple
model to show how the network of rm-to-rm arm-length transactions can help the government
enforce taxation. In that context, the authors demonstrate formally the important point that
value-added taxes and retail sales taxes are no longer equivalent as value added taxes are easier
to enforce using rm-to-rm transaction information. Third, Keen (2007) shows that a value-
added-tax allows to tax informal suppliers because formal businesses cannot take a deduction for
purchases from informal suppliers. Our paper focuses primarily on the within-rm information
network rather than the across-rm information network and is therefore complementary to the
Kopczuk-Slemrod and Keen papers.7 Finally, a number of studies in the corporate income tax
evasion literature have shown that the internal organization or the external activities of rms
can aect their tax reporting decisions.8
At a broad level, our paper is related to the large theoretical literature on mechanism de-
sign and implementation, especially work on mechanism design in environments with complete
information among agents (such as employees in a rm). This literature has been surveyed by
Moore (1992), who showed that cross-reporting is a powerful instrument that often allows the
principal to elicit truthful information from agents, at least in a non-cooperative setting and if
large nes are feasible. Our model of third-party reporting encompasses this basic idea, although
we allow for the possibility of collusive behavior and assume (realistically) that there is a upper
bound on the size of nes, both of which makes tax enforcement harder. In this case, it is not
always feasible to achieve truthful reporting and the ecacy of enforcement depends on rm
size. We come back to these mechanism design issues below, where we discuss the potential for
non-conventional tax enforcement mechanisms to improve the truthfulness of income reporting.
2.2 Literature on the Growth of Government
Our macro model contributes to a very long literature trying to explain the growth of govern-
ment. A number of theories have been put forward. First, the famous \Wagner's law" (after
7We discuss briey how the network of rm-to-rm transactions can also help enforcement as rms can also
denounce tax cheating of other rms.
8On the internal side, Crocker and Slemrod (2005) develop a shareholder-manager agency model with tax
evasion showing that penalties imposed on managers are more eective in reducing evasion than penalties imposed
on shareholders. Chen and Chu (2005) show that the evasion decision of the rm's owner aects the optimal
compensation scheme oered to employees and hence creates a distortion in the manager's eort and reduces
the eciency of the contract. On the external side, Bayer and Cowell (2005) show that imperfect competition
between rms have important consequences for the eciency eects of corporate tax audits.
5the German economist Adolph Wagner, 1835-1917) focuses on the demand side and posits that
public goods have an income elasticity above one (see Musgrave, 1966, for a detailed exposition
and analysis). Second, Baumol's cost disease theory focuses on the supply side and posits that,
over the course of development, productivity in the private sector increases while productivity
in the public sector stagnates, leading to a growth of government spending relative to GDP
(Baumol and Bowen, 1966; Baumol, 1967). Third, Peacock and Wiseman (1961) proposed a
\ratchet eect theory", whereby temporary shocks such as wars raise government expenditures,
which do not fall back after the shock as social norms regarding the proper level of public
goods and taxation are permanently aected by the temporary shock. Notice that the Wag-
ner, Baumol, and ratchet eect theories cannot explain the long period of stable government
expenditures before the 20th century, a period with some economic growth and with many wars
creating temporary spending shocks. Fourth, the Leviathan theory posits that governments are
controlled by self-interested politician-bureaucrats, unchecked by electoral constraints (Brennan
and Buchanan, 1980), and hence maximize revenue under constitutional and scal constraints.
Although proponents of the Leviathan theory have focused primarily on public choice and con-
stitutional aspects, this theory is entirely consistent with the importance of tax enforcement
constraints that we emphasize in this paper. Fifth, a large literature on political economy
considers the role of voting, lobbying, corruption, and political constitutions for the size of gov-
ernment. This literature has proposed that the democratization and increased political power of
the poor have played an important role for the growth of government (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2000). Moreover, substantial attention has been paid to the relationship between changes in
income distribution and voters' demand for redistribution (Peltzman, 1980; Lindert, 2004).
In addition to these hypotheses, a number of studies have pointed out that there are scal
capacity constraints to government growth (e.g., Kau and Rubin, 1981; Bird, 1989, 1992; Peltz-
man, 1980; Riezman and Slemrod, 1987; Kenny and Winer, 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2009). More-
over, there is a vast literature on the role of under-development in constraining tax structures
both historically and in current developing countries.9 Our theory proposes a micro-foundation
that accounts for the changes in scal constraints over the course of development.
Recently, Besley and Persson (2008, 2009) propose an extension of the ratchet eect theory
that emphasizes the role of increasing scal capacity over the course of development. They
9See, e.g., Alt (1983), Bird and Oldman (1990), Gillis (1989), Hettich and Winer (1991), Hinrichs (1966),
Kelley and Oldman (1973), Kenny and Winer (2006), Webber and Wildavsky (1996).
6develop a model where governments invest in scal capacity over time in response to wars.
Historically, major wars have often been associated with government investments in tax ca-
pacity such as information reporting and tax withholding. While wars have undoubtedly been
instrumental in the increased scal capacity of some countries such as the United Kingdom,
other countries such as Sweden have experienced a smooth growth in its tax-to-GDP ratio that
appears unrelated to wars (we discuss the empirical evidence in more detail in section 4). Fur-
thermore, the question remains why recent (20th century) wars have lead to large government
expansions, whereas earlier wars typically have not. Our paper contributes to this question and
is therefore complementary to the Besley-Persson theory.
3 A Micro Theory of Third-Party Tax Enforcement
Let us assume that N individuals are working in a rm and receive pre-tax wages w =
(w1;::;wN). The pre-tax prots of the rm are denoted by . Hence, the total value added
created by the rm is equal to V = W +  where W =
P
n wn are aggregate wages in the
rm. Value added is also equal to total sales S minus purchases P. Let us assume that the
government imposes a at tax at rate  on both wages and prots. If S and P are observable
to the government, then value added V = W +  = S   P is also observable. As a result,
under-reporting wages is useless to the rm because this would automatically increase its tax
on prots.10 However, if S and P are not observable to the government, then the rm can
possibly under-report wages W without having to over-report prots .11
In practice, S, P, and W (and hence ) would be observable to the government if the
rm truthfully records this information in its business records (such as accounting books and
payroll lists) and the government has access to these business records. Some rms may be able
to carry out their business without recording this information formally. For example, a small
family business might carry out all or part of its purchases and sales with cash and never record
this information. On the other hand, maintaining accurate business records is clearly helpful
to rm productivity: the business can measure its prots accurately, keep track of wages paid
out, plan production activities, obtain access to nancial sector services, formal insurance, etc.
10If the tax rate on prots is lower than on wages, there is an incentive to under-report wages and over-report
prots, and conversely.
11For example, the rm could exaggerate purchases or underreport sales. Symmetrically, the rm could
under-report prots without having to over-report wages.
7Realistically, the productivity gain of keeping business records is larger when the rm is larger
and more complex, and for modern rms the cost of being o-the-books becomes prohibitive.
We therefore assume that the rm maintains accurate business records, which creates potentially
detectable information within the rm.12 However, even though business records exist, the rm
may still be able to hide those records from the government to evade taxes. For example, the
rm may maintain a double set of books, true books for business purposes and edited books for
tax purposes. In this section, we present a simple agency theory showing how the government
can truthfully extract the true business record information using third-party reporting.13
Because we assume that the tax rate  on prots and wages is the same, there are no incen-
tives for prots and wage shifting and therefore wages and prots can be treated symmetrically.
Hence, without loss of generality, we can model the owner of the prots as one additional wage
earner, which simply amounts to ignoring prots (setting   0) in the analysis.14
3.1 Agency Model with Third-Party Reporting
3.1.1 Basic Setup
We assume that the government sets in place third-party reporting for tax purposes whereby
each employee is required to report her earnings to the government and the rm is also required
to report such individual earnings directly to the government.15 Therefore, employees and
employers have to agree on a wage report to the government as any discrepancy in the employer
and employee reports would generate a tax audit.16
We can therefore assume that the rm and employees agree on reports to the government
given by  w = ( w1;:::;  wN), and this determines tax payments to the government unless any tax
cheating is detected. We consider a situation where both real and reported wages (w;  w) are
determined cooperatively by the N employees of the rm. Because this is a tax collusion game, a
12In Section 4.4, we consider the implications of endogenizing the choice of being on the books as in Gordon
and Li (2005).
13We focus primarily on third party reporting within the rm. We discuss briey how third party reporting
between rms, as happens with a value-added-tax, can also help enforcement.
14To be sure, in practice, prots are dierent from wages because they are not recorded in the same way.
Wages are recorded on payroll lists while prots are typically obtained by substraction as  = S   P   W.
15For example, in the United States, such reports are made through W2 forms issued by rms and sent to
both the government and employees. Employees use this information to le their income tax returns (Logue
and Slemrod, 2008 discuss this mechanism in detail). Some other OECD countries, such as Denmark, use pre-
populated income tax returns whereby the government informs individuals about their earnings using information
received from rms.
16Indeed, tax agencies systematically search for discrepancies between employee and employer reports to target
tax audits.
8cooperative game seems to be the most natural one.17 As solution concept, we consider the core:
no coalition of employees can break o from the rm and obtain strictly better outcomes for each
member of this splitting coalition. In particular, the outcome of the cooperative game is Pareto
ecient (otherwise the coalition of all employees could do better) and therefore maximizes total
surplus of the employees in the rm. In this section, we take N and the outside options of each
employee as given. We denote by  y = ( y1;:::;  yN) the disposable income levels (net of taxes)
associated with those outside options.18 In the general equilibrium macro-model presented in
Section 4, we fully endogenize outside options and rm size N.
The presence of business records creates common knowledge within the rm. We capture
such common knowledge by assuming that (w;  w) is known to everyone within the rm. In
practice, although records may not be known to literally everyone within the rm, they are
widely used in the rm and will be known by a number of employees. We explore also the
alternative polar case where only employees for whom wn 6=  wn are aware of tax evasion and
can denounce tax cheating within the rm. This situation of private knowledge of tax evasion
might be more realistic in the case of external parties such as business or individual clients,
shareholders, or debt holders, a point we come back to later on.
Following the report  w to the government, taxes are paid at rate  based on  w. Each employee
n = 1;:::;N then decides either to stick to the report  wn or to whistleblow and reveal the true
information to the government if w 6=  w. We further assume that internal business records
create veriable information: If any employee whistleblows and reveals the information (w;  w)
of the company to the government and the government carries out an audit, the government
will indeed be able to verify the information (w;  w) with the cooperation of the whistleblower.
Because true business records are widely used within the company, it is impossible to hide them
if a single knowledgeable insider is determined to reveal the true information to the government.
In contrast, if no employee is willing the break a collusive tax cheating agreement, then it is
much harder for the government to discover the true information. For simplicity, in that case,
we assume that the government cannot detect cheating at all.
When evasion is detected, we assume that the government charges the evaded tax plus a
17The substance of our results generalizes to a non-cooperative game. The non-cooperative case always makes
tax enforcement easier relative to the cooperative case.
18More precisely, we assume that outside options for any coalition of individuals is always given by  y =
( y1;:::;  yN).
9ne. As in all tax enforcement studies, we assume that there is an exogenous upper bound 
on the level of nes relative to tax evaded.19 In that case, it is straightforward to show that it
is always best for the government to impose the maximum possible ne in all circumstances.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that the penalty is equal to  percent of the
evaded tax to each person caught evading. In addition, the government may oer a reward to
whistleblowers equal to a share  of total uncovered tax evasion. For simplicity, we assume that
all workers are risk neutral.20
The timing of the game is as follows: (1) employees agree cooperatively on a vector of wages
w = (w1;:::;wN) and a vector of reports  w = ( w1;:::;  wN), (2) taxes are paid based on  w at rate
, (3) each employee n decides to stick to the report  wn or to whistleblow if w 6=  w, and (4) the
government decides to audit or not, and nes and potential whistleblower rewards are paid.
Proposition 1 If all employees can commit ex-ante never to denounce tax cheating to the
government, then in any cooperative equilibrium in the core, we have  wn = 0 for all n and no
taxes are paid.
Proof: Suppose that  wn > 0 for some n. Then lowering  wn to zero increases the distributable
surplus by   wn and hence can increase the payo of every employee without increasing the risk
of detection as employees can commit not to denounce. Hence, (w;  w) with
P
n  wn > 0 cannot
be in the core. QED.
The complete cheating equilibrium result of Proposition 1 is unlikely to be robust in practice.
There are two sets of reasons why employees may denounce tax cheating to the government.
The rst set of reasons is the presence of random shocks such as a conict between an employee
and the employer, moral concerns of a newly hired employee, or simply a mistake whereby an
employee reveals the true records w to the government instead of the fake records  w. The
second reason is the presence of rational whistleblowing if the government oers a reward to
whistleblowers. We develop both models below and show that, when rms are large, the result
of Proposition 1 is not robust as tax evasion is bound to be uncovered, which deters it in the
19Without such an upper bound, the government would impose innite penalties and hence fully deter tax
evasion in the rst place. Such innite nes are not tolerable in practice because punishment ought to be
proportionate to the crime and because it is often very dicult to tell apart honest mistakes from intentional
evasion. Therefore, imposing an upper bound on nes is both realistic and makes the tax enforcement theoretical
problem non-trivial.
20Assuming risk aversion would make tax enforcement easier for the government. We consider risk aversion
in Section 3.2 in the context of the Allingham-Sandmo model.
10rst place. As we shall see, the random shock model shows that the evasion equilibrium is not
robust to introducing a trembling hand, while the whistleblower model shows that the evasion
equilibrium is not robust to relaxing the perfect commitment assumption.
3.1.2 Random Shock Model
We incorporate the possibility that an employee may deviate and reveal internal business records
either by mistake, because he is disgruntled, or because of moral concerns.21 Let " be the
probability of any given employee revealing true information through such random shocks. We
assume for simplicity that those shocks are iid across employees. With N employees, nobody
will denounce tax cheating with probability (1   ")N. The probability that somebody in the
rm reveals true information (and hence triggers an audit) is therefore given by 1   (1   ")
N.
This probability is increasing in N, and tends to 1 as N tends to innity as a random shock is
bound to happen when the number of employees is very large.
The expected pay-o of each employee equals
yn = wn      wn   (1   (1   ")
N)    (1 + )  (wn    wn)
+:
We assume that workers decide cooperatively on vectors of true and reported wages (w;  w),
taking as given the random shocks in the second stage. The possible outcomes of this cooperative
game (the core) are characterized by the set of vectors (w;  w) that maximize the total expected
surplus Y =
P
n yn, subject to the resource constraint
PN
n=1 wn = W, non-negativity constraints
wn;  wn  0 for all n, and participation constraints yn   yn for all n, ensuring that each employee
obtains a payo that is at least as high as his best available outside option  yn. The coalition of
workers 1;:::;N will nd it optimal to increase or decrease the report  wn for worker n depending
on the derivative of total surplus with respect to  wn. When  wn < wn, we have:
@Y
@  wn
=   [ 1 + (1 + )(1   (1   ")
N)]: (1)
When  wn > wn, we have: @Y
@  wn =  ; so that it never pays to over-report wages.22
Proposition 2 In the random shock model, any cooperative solution is such that:
21For example, an employee might no longer be able to condone tax cheating and decides to denounce the
rm. Alternatively, a newly hired employee might not be willing to go along with tax cheating.
22In principle, in case of over-reporting uncovered by an audit, overpaid taxes will be refunded. This would
not change the fact that @Y=@  wn < 0 when  wn > wn.
11(a) If (1   ")N  =(1 + ), there is no tax evasion at all:  w = w.
(b) If (1   ")N > =(1 + ), there is complete tax evasion:  w = 0.
(c) For any  > 0 and " > 0, there is  N such as rms do not evade when N   N.
Proof: The proof of (a) and (b) is immediate as @Y=@  wn  0 i (1 + )(1   (1   ")N)  1
i =(1 + )  (1   ")N. For (b), where @Y=@  wn < 0, the solution is determined by the non-
negativity constraint  wn  0 for all n. For (c),  N is dened by =(1 + ) = (1   ")
 N, i.e.,
 N = log(=(1 + ))=log(1   "). QED.
Four points are worth noting about Proposition 2. First, when " = 0, we are back to the
standard collusive case where rm size does not help and there is always tax evasion. Second,
when " > 0 and even for moderate nes  > 0, it will always be the case that large rms choose
not to evade, destroying the evasion equilibrium from Proposition 1. Our model can therefore
explain why low nes and low audit rates can lead to successful enforcement in practice. This
resolves the key puzzle of the Allingham-Sandmo model, which predicts extremely high evasion
rates when audit rates and nes are low (given reasonable risk aversion parameters). Third, our
qualitative results are robust to introducing risk aversion, which would make tax enforcement
easier. Fourth, the results in the proposition do not depend on the specic division of revenue
W across workers. The equilibrium division will depend on the outside opportunities  y and
other factors not explicitly specied that determine the bargaining power of the individuals.
Private vs. Common Knowledge of Cheating:
The model above assumes that each employee has complete knowledge of the full set of wages
w;  w. An alternative polar assumption is that each worker knows only about his/her own wages
wn;  wn, while the employer is the only one knowing the full information (w;  w). This private
knowledge model is more realistic in the case of external parties such as business or individual
clients, shareholders, or debt holders, which share specic information with the rm but might
not know the complete information within the rm. Critically, we maintain the assumption
that, if there is under-reporting for individual n ( wn < wn) and individual n denounces the
rm, the government will carry out an audit and then be able to observe the full set of actual
and reported wages w;  w. This assumption can be defended as follows. A formal business needs
to record w and  w. Individual n can prove that wn 6=  wn as long as wn was formally paid
out. Therefore, with hard evidence that the rm cheated on individual n, an investigation may
12be able to retrieve the true business records and obtain full information w;  w. In other words,
the rm is a nexus of information written in the internal business records, and the information
cannot be broken or hidden into isolated pieces.
Proposition 3 In the random shock model with only private information on incomes:
(a) The optimal evasion strategy for the rm is to report zero income for the Nc highest-paid
employees, where Nc is an integer below  N dened as [1   (1   ")
 N](1 + ) = 1.
(b) Assuming a xed distribution of wage incomes, the fraction of income evaded tends to zero
as N gets large.
Proof:
(a) If Nc individuals evade, then the probability of detection equals 1 (1 ")Nc as only cheating




[wn      wn   (1   (1   ")
Nc)    (1 + )  (wn    wn)
+]:
When  wn < wn, we have:
@Y
@  wn
=   [ 1 + (1 + )(1   (1   ")
Nc)]:
Therefore, evasion is protable only if Nc   N dened as [1   (1   ")
 N](1 + ) = 1. An
equilibrium with Nc   N evaders Pareto dominates an equilibrium with truthful reporting,
because the payo from the Nc evaders is higher due to underreporting, while the payo from
everybody else is unaected. Moreover, when an employee evades, the surplus is maximized by
full evasion:  wn = 0. Because the extra surplus created by full evasion is proportional to wn,
surplus is maximized by having the highest-paid employees evade. Given Nc   N, the optimal
number of evaders reects a trade-o between the extra surplus from the Ncth evader and the
higher probability of being caught for all other evaders. It is optimal to evade for at least one
employee (the highest paid) i "(1 + )  1 ,  N  1.
(b) Because  N is xed, as N goes to innity, we have that Nc=N   N=N goes to zero|a
vanishing fraction of employees will be able to evade. If the wage distribution is xed, the share
of total compensation going to a vanishing fraction of employees also converges to zero. QED.
Two points are worth noting about Proposition 3. First, our results of successful enforcement
for large rms remains valid in the case of only private information, which is the least favorable
13to tax enforcement. Second, this case may capture some of the real-world tax evasion practices
of large rms. Most of the corporate income tax evasion does not take place as collusion to
under-report the wages of ordinary employees, but takes place as under-reporting of prots by
setting up illegal tax shelters. Such tax shelters are known or understood by a relatively small
number of key accountants, a situation where the tax savings are large relative to the number
of individuals in the know as in the proposition (see e.g., Slemrod 2004). Firms that plan on
evading taxes therefore have an incentive to limit the ow of information within the rm.
3.1.3 Rational Whistleblower Model
We now consider the case where the government oers a whistleblower reward and we assume
that each individual may voluntarily and rationally denounce their employer. Hence, we relax
the critical assumption of ex-ante commitment from Proposition 1. In practice, rms do not have
the power to enforce non-whistleblowing commitments.23 We assume that the whistleblower
reward is equal to a fraction  of total uncovered revenue shared among all whistleblowers.24
Several OECD countries use such whistleblower rewards to induce insiders to denounce
large-scale tax evasion within rms. For example, in the United States, the IRS Whistleblower
Reward Program oers a payment of 15-30% of total uncovered tax revenue when whistleblowing
leads to the detection of tax evasion in the excess of $2 million (Hesch, 2002). Related, Japan
allows laid-o workers to claim unemployment benets even if their employer did not pay social
security contributions (OECD, 2004). Such claims help the government discover businesses
evading social security taxes.25 Alternatively, this model can be interpreted to capture moral
rewards from denouncing large-scale tax cheating, assuming that each dollar of revenue that the
whistleblower helps uncover creates a psychological reward of  dollars.26
Given payments w = (w1;:::;wN) and reports  w = ( w1;:::;  wN), the payo for employee n if
23Organized crime can succeed in enforcing non-whistleblowing agreements by threats of severe retaliation.
Short of falling into organized crime, rms cannot impose severe retaliation (Dixit, 2004). In a dynamic model,
it is conceivable that whistleblowers could be red and hence lose future rents from the employment match.
Such an extension would make enforcement harder, but would not change the essence of our results.
24We discuss in Section 3.1.4 whether such a form of whistleblowing rewards can be seen as an optimal
mechanism for the government to elicit tax compliance.
25Interestingly, laid-o employees no longer derive surplus from the employment relationship and hence have
less to lose when denouncing tax evasion than current employees.
26If moral rewards are heterogeneous across individuals and unobservable by the employer, the model becomes
conceptually very close to the random-shock model analyzed above.
14he does not whistleblow is given by
yn = wn     wn   a(1 + ) (wn    wn)
+ ; (2)
where a = 0;1 is an audit dummy that takes the value 1 if any employee whistleblows. The
payo for employee n if he whistleblows (in which case a = 1) is given by
yn = wn     wn   (1 + ) (wn    wn)
+ +
 (1 + )
P




where Nw denotes the number of whistleblowers who share equally the rewards from whistle-
blowing. We assume that the whistleblower reward is a share of total revenue (including nes),
because this turns out to be notationally simpler below.





wn0     wn0   a  (1   )(1 + ) (wn0    wn0)
+
: (4)
A cooperative solution (w;  w) maximizes surplus Y subject to
P
n0 wn0 = W, non-negativity
constraints wn;  wn  0 for all n, and participation constraints yn   yn for all n. Notice that
(1   )(1 + )  1 ,   =(1 + ) is required to avoid a situation where employees always
evade and then collectively whistleblow in order to recoup larger rewards than the nes they
pay for under-reporting in the rst place.
Moreover, because ex-ante commitments to not whistleblowing are infeasible, a cooperative
solution with evasion must also satisfy incentive compatibility constraints ensuring that no
worker nds it in his interest to whistleblow ex post. Therefore, given that co-workers do not
whistleblow, utility for employee n must be higher under no whistleblowing (eq. 2 with a = 0)
than under whistleblowing (eq. 3 with Nw = 1), implying that, for all n,
 
(wn    wn)
+
P
n0 (wn0    wn0)
+: (5)
On the other hand, if at least one co-worker whistleblows, employee n will always nd it in his
interest to also whistleblow.
Proposition 4 In the whistleblower model, any cooperative solution is such that:
(a) If N > 1=, then there can be no tax evasion at all:  w = w. Hence large rms do not evade
taxes even if  > 0 is very small.
15(b) If N  1=, then some evasion is sustainable, and an outcome without evasion is Pareto
dominated by a sustainable evasion equilibrium. In the evasion equilibrium, the lowest-paid
employee always reports zero wages (full evasion). All other employees may report positive
wages (less than full evasion), but evade by at least as much as the lowest-paid employee in
absolute terms. If wages w1;:::;wN are equal, then all employees report zero wages.
Proof: For (a), let us assume that N > 1= and that there is some evasion E 
P
n0(wn0   wn0) >
0. Then, from eq. (5), we have wn    wn  E for all n. Summing across all n, this implies
E    N  E. Because E > 0, this implies 1    N, which is a contradiction.
For (b), if some evasion is sustained (E > 0), then we must have wn    wn  E for all n.
Because   1
N in this case, it is feasible to satisfy this condition, for example by having equal
evasion across all employees: wn    wn = E
N  E for all n. Thus, starting from an outcome
without evasion it is possible to reduce  wn by a small amount d  w for all n and thereby generate a
sustainable Pareto improvement. The evasion equilibrium is characterized by the maximization
of total surplus Y at a = 0 subject to
P
n0 wn0 = W, non-negativity wn;  wn  0, participation
constraints yn = wn     wn   yn, and the no-whistleblowing constraint (5) for all n. In this
case, total surplus is given by Y = (1   )W +E, implying that the equilibrium maximizes E
subject to wn   wn  E and wn  0;  wn  0, wn   wn   yn for all n. Because no employee can
report negative wages, the no-whistleblowing constraint is hardest to satisfy for the lowest-paid
individual, say employee 1, who can at the most evade by w1 = minn wn   yn > 0. Therefore,
to maximize E, there is full evasion for the lowest-paid employee ( w1 = 0) and total evasion is
taken to the point where (5) is binding for this employee, E = 1
w1  Nw1. All other employees
evade by at least as much as the lowest-paid employee in absolute terms, wn    wn  w1 for
all n, but possibly by less in relative terms (less than full evasion). Obviously, if all wages are
equal, then zero reporting by all employees is sustainable. QED.
Three points are worth noting about Proposition 4. First, if  = 0, i.e., if the government
oers no reward for whistleblowing, then all rms will evade taxes as in Proposition 1. Second,
as soon as some reward  > 0 is oered, then tax evasion is no longer sustainable for large rms.
Therefore, the whistleblowing model also shows that low-powered nes and audit rates are
enough to sustain truthful reporting in large rms. This shows that the collusion equilibrium
of Proposition 1 is not robust to relaxing the assumption of perfect commitment. Third, in
this model, equality in the distribution of true wages w1;:::;wN has a positive impact on the
16level of evasion that can be sustained in equilibrium. This is because low-paid workers are
constrained in their evasion and therefore more tempted to whistleblow to get a share of total
uncovered revenue. Because the wage structure is itself part of the cooperative evasion game,
this creates an incentive for workers to agree on an equal wage structure so as to sustain full
evasion. However, the equilibrium division of surplus depends also on the outside opportunities.
In particular, complete wage equality and full tax evasion is not necessarily an equilibrium,
because employees with good outside opportunities (presumably high-skilled workers) may not
be willing to accept this division of surplus despite the extra tax evasion it delivers.
Finally, we may also consider the case with only private knowledge about cheating. Let us
assume that only employees involved in cheating can denounce the rm, and that they form
rational expectations about the extent of total cheating within the rm. Consistent with the
random shock model, we would again have that the rm oers evasion to at most Nc = 1=
employees, and cheating will be concentrated among the highest-paid employees. As N becomes
large, the fraction of employees evading and the share of total earnings evaded will shrink to
zero.
3.1.4 Mechanism Design
The general lesson from our model is that common information among tax payers dramatically
increases the ability of the government to extract tax revenue even with bounded nes. We
have proposed a whistleblowing mechanism, which achieves perfect enforcement when N is
suciently large. The natural question is whether this mechanism is globally optimal, or if the
government could do even better. Three points are worth noting.
First, when there is only one individual (N = 1) and keeping the assumption that the
government can only successfully audit after whistleblowing, there is no mechanism that could
induce the individual to reveal income truthfully.
Second, if there is more than one individual (N  2), then in principle the government could
design a non-conventional whistleblowing mechanism that induces truthful reporting. This
mechanism is as follows: if the government receives information from Nw whistleblowers, it will
randomly select one whistleblower n, forgive n his evaded tax and corresponding ne, and oer
n a small fraction of the tax evaded by the other individuals.27 This mechanism would induce
27This mechanism is non-conventional in the sense that we are not aware of any tax agency implementing it
in practice.
17any individual to denounce tax cheating and make tax collusion impossible to sustain as long as
N  2. This strong implementation result is consistent with the mechanism design literature,
which has shown that rst best is often implementable in common information environments
using suciently sophisticated mechanisms (Moore, 1992).
Third and most important, the complete enforcement result with a small number of in-
dividuals (N  2) is not robust. An insider is willing to whistleblow only if rewards from
whistleblowing are larger than the loss of breaking the collusion agreement. In our 1-period
model and under the non-conventional mechanism described above, there is no loss from break-
ing collusion. However, in practice, breaking a tax collusion may generate both monetary costs
(loss of future surplus from the worker-rm match, search costs to nd a new job, etc.) and
psychological costs (in the form of a conict with colleagues). If those costs are non-trivial, then
the net rewards from whistleblowing need to be non-trivial as well, and in this case evasion can
only be fully deterred when N is suciently large. Therefore, we believe that the results we
have presented capture the gist of the real-world tax policy problem.
3.1.5 The Role of External Business Records and the Scope of the Firm
Our theory posits that the success of third-party reporting derives from the presence of veri-
able internal business records that is commonly known among a suciently large number of
employees. It is useful to contrast our theory with situations where such records are not present,
or when externally recorded transactions allow outside business partners to denounce the rm.
External Business Records and Value-Added Taxes
Information on income generated by a business can also be obtained from external transactions.
For example, businesses need to provide accounting records to shareholders or debt providers.
Value added (equal to the sum of wages and prots as we discussed above) can be inferred from
value added taxes (all OECD countries except the United States impose value added taxes).
The presence of publicly disclosed accounting books certainly imposes constraints on how
much rms can evade as accounting books and corporate tax returns have to be consistent.
Theoretically, the rm could collude with shareholders and banks to publicly disclose fake
accounting books while secretly showing the true books to prospective shareholders and lenders.
Exactly as in our model, such collusion would be very dicult to maintain with a large number
of players. Therefore, rms which want to raise equity or debt need to maintain accurate
18business records and cannot easily escape taxation.28 If taxes on earnings are not linear, it is
still possible to manipulate the distribution of reported earnings while truthfully reporting total
earnings. This type of evasion could be analyzed along the lines we have proposed.
Value-added-taxes (VAT) require rms to keep accounts of all purchases and sales and pay
taxes on sales net of purchases. Therefore, each rm has an incentive to under-report sales
and over-report purchases hence creating opposite incentives across businesses engaged in arm-
length transactions. Starting from a no evasion equilibrium, only businesses selling directly to
households for nal consumption can unilaterally evade by under-reporting sales. Even in that
case, evasion is partial as businesses cannot consistently report negative value-added without
raising suspicions. Exactly as in our model, we would expect small retailers to be able to evade
partly the VAT while large retailing chains need to maintain formal business records making
evasion much harder. Businesses further up in the VAT chain need to collude with businesses
further down the chain to evade VAT. Therefore, as long as there is a large business further
down the chain, VAT evasion is not feasible even for small informal businesses (Keen, 2007).
However, if all businesses were small and informal, it would be impossible to implement a VAT
as the tax would unravel from the bottom up. Therefore, in the end, we believe that it is again
the presence of a large business which uses business records and cannot successfully hide them
that makes the VAT successful, exactly as in our basic model.29
Scope of the Firm
Firms can evade some taxes by sub-contracting services, such as janitorial or building main-
tenance services, to providers which are often small and may not need to use business records.
Such providers can evade taxes and therefore provide the service more cheaply than when those
services are integrated and hence fully taxable. A particular example of such sub-contracting
is given by tips, which are often additional o-the-books payments that take place directly be-
tween clients and employees. A related form of evasion takes the form of envelope wages where
a share of wages is paid in cash outside the books. Such evasion is common in Eastern European
countries in small businesses (OECD, 2004).
28As in Gordon and Li (2005), this debt channel is one of the benets of using accounting books and being
formal.
29No developing country with few large businesses can successfully implement a broad VAT (Ebrill at al.,
2001). Furthermore, the VAT is not a necessary condition for successful corporate and individual income tax
enforcement as show by the example of the United States.
193.2 Embedding Third-Party Reporting in the Allingham-Sandmo
Model
The Allingham-Sandmo (A-S) model of tax evasion has been the dominating theoretical model
for the analysis of tax evasion. It is therefore important to analyze how third-party reporting
aects the results from this standard model.
Consider a taxpayer with true income w = wt + ws, where wt is subject to third-party
reporting (such as wages and salaries) while ws is purely self-reported (such as self-employment
income). The taxpayer reports  wt and  ws to the government. Based on our previous analysis,
let us assume that we are in a situation with a large rm using business records, implying that
third-party reporting is truthful and hence  wt = wt. Indeed, if  wt < wt, the tax administration
will catch the under-reporting with probability one through matching of information returns
and tax returns. Therefore, in this case, self-reported income  ws is the only choice variable of
the individual as in the A-S model.
The probability of being audited and having one's under-reported income discovered is given
by p. In the basic A-S model, the probability p is independent of the reports  ws and  wt. The
taxpayer solves the following expected utility maximization problem:
max
 ws
(1   p)  u(w   (wt +  ws)) + p  u
 
w(1   )    (ws    ws)
+
: (6)
3.2.1 Irrelevance of Third-Party Reporting
We can redene the problem in terms of total reported income  w   wt +  ws, in which case the
taxpayer maximizes with respect to  w:
max
 w (1   p)  u(w     w) + p  u
 
w(1   )    (w    w)
+
: (7)
This problem is exactly identical to the standard A-S problem with no third-party reporting.
Let us denote by w the level of earnings reported in the standard A-S model. We have:
Proposition 5 Irrelevance of third-party reporting in the standard Allingham-Sandmo model:
Under a constant audit probability and with no constraints on self-reported income, the total
level of earnings reported  wt +  ws is equal to w. Therefore, tax evasion is independent of the
fraction of income that is subject to third-party reporting.
20Third-party reporting does not improve enforcement because the taxpayer can counteract
additional third-party reporting by adjusting self-reported income so as to achieve his optimal
amount of evasion at the given probability of being detected and penalty. There is eectively
100% crowd-out of self-reported income by exogenously increased third-party reported income.
3.2.2 Breaking the Irrelevance Result
There are two assumptions underlying the strong result in Proposition 5: (i) the tax policy
allows losses to count fully against positive income in the tax calculation, (ii) the enforcement
policy imposes an audit probability that does not depend on the report  ws, and in particular
does not depend on whether  ws is positive or negative. In real-world tax systems, neither of
these assumptions are typically satised. Deductibility of losses is disallowed to some degree
and self-reported losses and deductions face higher audit rates than positive income. The above
model oers a possible explanation of why this is so: it is because governments wish to protect
the enforcement benets of third-party reporting.
Disallowing Losses:
Let us assume that self-reported losses,  ws < 0, are not allowed to be deducted for tax purposes
from third-party reported income  wt > 0. We prove the following proposition in appendix A.
Proposition 6 Suppose that losses are disallowed. Consider a small increase in third-party
reported income dwt keeping total income w constant.
(a) If wt < w, then d  ws=dwt =  1: increasing the fraction of income subject to third-party
reporting does not increase total reported income wt +  ws (100% crowd-out).
(b) If wt > w, then d  ws=dwt = 0: increasing the fraction of income subject to third-party
reporting increases one for one total reported income wt +  ws (0% crowd-out).
In practice, governments often disallow losses in self-reported income to count against other
income items. For example, the United States limits the deductibility of negative capital gains
to only $3,000.30 Losses in passive activities are also not allowed to count against other positive
income items. In those circumstances, the irrelevance result breaks down and third-party re-
porting does reduce overall tax evasion. We argue that those ndings help explain the historical
30In the case of capital gains, although selling prices are often third-party reported, the buying price is self-
reported in most cases, so that capital gains can be seen as eectively self-reported.
21development of income taxation. Early income taxes started to raise signicant revenue only
after third-party income reporting became available and began as schedular taxes, i.e. with
dierent income components being taxed separately. As a result, third-party reported tax bases
were protected against losses in other self-reported tax bases. Initial comprehensive individ-
ual income taxes started with large exemption levels (so that only a minority of top income
individuals were taxed) because, in early stages of economic development, many middle- and
bottom-income earners were self-employed and income taxes cannot be enforced on such self-
reported incomes. In contrast, third-party reporting was easier to implement for top incomes,
which take the form of interest, dividends, large salaries, or business prots from large companies
that are all recorded in formal accounting books.
Dierential Audit Rates:
Let us assume that audit rates depend on self-reported income  ws. We assume that p( ws) is
twice dierentiable with derivatives p0 ( ws) < 0 and p00( ws)  0. These assumptions appear
to capture real-world auditing strategies in a stylized way. In particular, the assumption of a
negative rst-order derivative reects that less aggressive/suspicious behavior (higher  ws) lowers
the risk of being audited.31 The assumption of a non-negative second-order derivative reects
that, if the report is already unsuspicious (high  ws) and the audit probability therefore low,
increasing reported income will have a relatively small impact.32
Proposition 7 Suppose that the audit probability p( ws) satises p0( ws) < 0, p00( ws)  0. Con-
sider a small increase in third-party reported income dwt keeping total income w constant. Then
d  w
dwt = 1 + d  ws
dwt > 0: there is less than 100% crowd-out of increased third-party reported income
by reduced self-reported income.
The proof is presented in appendix A. Two points are worth noting. First, the condition
p00( ws)  0 is sucient (but not necessary) to ensure incomplete crowding out.33 Second, the
key reason why there is less than 100% crowd-out is because the government uses third-party
31For example, in the United States, tax preparers are known to calibrate the audit probability to the wishes
of their clients. An audit probability of about 0.3 is seen by tax preparers as an `aggressive report'.
32For example, some countries select tax returns for audits based on computer-generated audit ags, where
ags are triggered by return characteristics that appear to be suspicious or aggressive. A return may receive
more than one ag if several line items raise suspicion, and the number of ags determine the probability of an
audit. In such a system, as the return becomes more unsuspicious (reported income goes up) and the number
of ags approaches zero, increases in reported income will have a very small impact on the audit probability.
33It is theoretically possible to obtain more than 100% crowding out if p were (very) concave.
22reports to determine its audit policy: p is a function of  ws and hence of wt =  w   ws for a given
 w. The case p = p( w) would generate the same irrelevance result as in Proposition 5.
It would be useful to develop a formal normative tax and audit theory, which could generate
as optimal policies the actual tax and audit policies observed over the course of economic
development. We conjecture that disallowing self-reported losses could be desirable and that,
more generally, the optimal audit policy would depend not only on total reported income but
also on self-reported income. We leave this analysis for future research.
4 A Macro Theory of Tax Enforcement and Government
Size
In this section, we set out a simple growth model that can explain the observed evolution of
rm size, third-party income tax enforcement, and government size over the course of economic
development. For expositional simplicity, we maintain the assumption that rms always main-
tain internal business records, which creates potentially detectable information within the rm.
This assumption is not realistic for economies in very early stages of development where most
rms are small and informal. We show in Section 4.4 that it is possible to endogenize the de-
cision to use business records. In that case, endogenous books choice creates a consistent and
reinforcing mechanism whereby growth and increasing rm size/complexity make it easier to
enforce income taxation using third-party reporting.
4.1 Macro Model Without Enforcement Problems
Households
There is a continuum (of measure one) of homogeneous individuals, who derive utility u(c;g)
from the consumption of a private good c and a tax nanced public good g. We assume that
u(c;g) is homothetic, implying that the public good has an income elasticity equal to one (see
below). We also assume that uc(c;0) > 0, so that public goods are not essential for prosperity.
We assume that labor is inelastically supplied. We denote by w the pre-tax labor income
of each individual and by  the tax rate on income. Under truthful reporting, the budget
constraint is given by c = (1   )w, where the price of the private good is normalized to one.
Government
23We consider a benevolent government choosing public goods g and taxes  so as to maximize the
welfare of the representative individual subject to a government budget constraint. The assump-
tion of a benevolent government is not crucial for the model: as discussed earlier, our theory of
government growth could alternatively be presented within the context of a Leviathan model
where self-interested politician-bureaucrats maximize revenue for their own consumption.34
The government can convert one unit of c into one unit of g. Absent any enforcement
problem, the government budget constraint is given by g = w. In this case, the government
maximizes u((1   )w;w) with respect to , so that the standard Samuelson rule uc(c;g) =








Importantly, the optimal tax rate is independent of income w and hence will be constant along
the growth path. Thus, optimal government spending as a share of income, g=w = , is
constant and the public good income elasticity is equal to one. This implies that the size of
government to GDP would be constant over time in the absence of enforcement problems.
Firms and Productivity
We assume that all rms have access to the same production technology. For each rm, the
average product of labor equals x(N;A), where N is the number of employees in the rm and
A is a technology parameter that grows exogenously over time. We assume that x(N;A) is
increasing in A and inversely U-shaped in N. The assumption that average productivity is
inversely U-shaped in N mirrors the standard assumption of a U-shaped average cost curve.
Furthermore, we assume that technological progress is complementary to labor input, dened
as xA (N;A)=x(N;A) being increasing in N.
Let ^ N(A) be the rm size maximizing average productivity (minimizing average costs), i.e.







where the inequality follows from the assumption xA=x increasing in N (and using xN( ^ N;A) =
0), which implies xAN( ^ N;A) = xNA( ^ N;A) > 0.
34Although both models can provide a positive theory of government growth, their normative implications are
obviously very dierent.
24We assume perfect competition in all markets, implying that rms take the output price and
wages as given. Prots are given by x(N;A)  N   w  N, which is maximized with respect to
rm size N. The rst-order condition for rm size is given by xN  N + x   w = 0. We assume
that there is free entry of rms, which leads to zero prots in general equilibrium. Hence, we
have x = w and the rst-order condition for N reduces to xN(N;A) = 0. Therefore, the optimal
size of rms is given by the productivity-maximizing level ^ N(A).
In our model, N is the number of employees in the rm so that we can directly apply the
model from Section 3. It would also be possible to interpret N more broadly as the number of
external parties that share some of the information of the business. In such an interpretation,
a more inter-connected production process becomes more valuable as technology progresses.
4.2 Incorporating Tax Evasion into the Model
We consider the whistleblower model of tax evasion. The whistleblower model simplies the
presentation, because it involves no uncertainty. From Proposition 4, either there is evasion
that always goes undetected or there is no evasion at all. Furthermore, because all workers are
identical in this model, when there is evasion, it is complete.
As before, we consider a cooperative game where the rm and its employees agree on true
and reported wages (w;  w) to maximize total surplus. Either they report truthfully ( w = w)
and workers pay taxes w, or they report dishonestly ( w = 0) and workers pay no tax. For
expositional simplicity, it is convenient to assume that the rm has all the bargaining power,
implying that the solution maximizes prots under the constraint that each employee receives
his outside option. Therefore, unlike the micro model in Section 3, we do not characterize the
entire set of cooperative equilibria (the core), but a specic equilibrium where the rm gets the
surplus from evasion.35 Notice though, that in general equilibrium where free entry eliminates
pure prots, the workers ultimately receive all the surplus from tax evasion.
Let  y be the net-of-tax income of each employee in his best outside option, where  y is
determined by the equilibrium in the labor market and taken as given by the rm. The rm
has to oer each employee a pre-tax compensation equal to  y=(1   ) if it complies with the
tax law, and equal to  y if it evades all taxes. Denoting by 1( w = w) the indicator variable
35This equilibrium is natural given the assumptions of no hiring-ring costs and perfect competition in the
labor market. Under those assumptions, if one worker does not accept the proposed division of surplus, the rm
can costlessly hire another worker at his marginal product.
25equal to one under truthful reporting and zero under full evasion, prots can be written as
x(N;A)  N  
 y
1 1(  w=w)  N. Hence, for the rm, under-reporting wages to the government
lowers the before-tax wage it has to pay its employees. The potential cost of under-reporting is
that it may be denounced by an employee seeking the whistleblower reward .
If the rm does not evade, then we saw in the previous section that equilibrium rm size
equals ^ N(A), the before-tax wage is given by w = x( ^ N(A);A), and the after-tax wage is given
by y = (1   )  x( ^ N(A);A). If the rm evades and nobody whistleblows, each employee
income is w = y = x(N;A). If an employee whistleblows (and nobody else does), he obtains
x(N;A) (1+)x(N;A)+(1+)x(N;A)N. Therefore, the employee does not whistleblow
i x(N;A)  x(N;A)   (1 + )x(N;A) + (1 + )x(N;A)N, which is equivalent to N  1=
as in Proposition 4. Hence, a rm that evades tax has to choose a rm size below 1=.36
Proposition 8 We obtain the following cases:
(1) If ^ N(A)  1=, then the rm evades all taxes and chooses the optimal rm size ^ N(A).
(2) If ^ N(A) > 1= then:
(a) If x( ^ N(A);A)  (1   ) < x(1=;A), then the rm evades all taxes and chooses sub-
optimal rm size 1=.
(b) If x( ^ N(A);A)  (1   )  x(1=;A), then the rm does not evade and chooses the
optimal rm size ^ N(A).
Proof: The proof of (1) follows from the fact that prots are always greater under evasion
when this can be sustained at the optimal rm size ^ N(A). The proof of (2a) and (2b) follows
from the observation that, once evasion is not sustainable under the optimal rm size ^ N(A),
an evading rm must reduce rm size to 1=. Under full evasion and N = 1=, the free-entry
(zero-prot) equilibrium is characterized by labor income y = x(1=;A). Under no evasion and
N = ^ N(A), the free-entry equilibrium has labor income y = (1   )x( ^ N(A);A). In a labor
market equilibrium, the outcome will be the one associated with the highest labor income,
which gives the conditions in the proposition. QED.
36Notice that the decision to whistleblow is independent of the level of public goods g, because whistleblowing
within a single rm does not aect the aggregate level of g.
26Note that Proposition 8 implies that taxation distorts rm size away from intermediate levels
above 1=. The result is consistent with the empirical phenomenon of the \missing middle"
discussed in the development literature (e.g., Tybout, 2000). A recent paper by Dharmapala,
Slemrod and Wilson (2008) argues that the missing middle may be the outcome of optimal
tax policies that exempt small rms from taxation in order to save on administrative costs. In
our model, the missing middle does not arise because small rms are tax exempt de jure, but
because small rms can sustain tax evasion and therefore become tax exempt de facto.
4.3 Macroeconomic Development and Optimal Government Policy
We now turn to the evolution of government size over the growth process. Let AL be the
technology level such that ^ N(AL) = 1= and AH the technology level such that x( ^ N(AH);AH)
(1   ) = x(1=;AH). Obviously, we have 0 < AL  AH and AL = AH i  = 0.
Proposition 9 We have the following three stages of development:
(1) Early Stage: when A  AL, the government cannot raise any tax revenue and sets (A) = 0.
(2) Intermediate Stage: when AL < A < AH, the government is constrained by tax enforce-
ment and sets (A) such that x( ^ N(A);A)  (1   (A)) = x(1=;A). Firms do not evade taxes.
Government size is suboptimal, (A) < , and (A) is increasing in A.
(3) Late Stage: when A  AH, the government is no longer constrained by tax enforcement and
rms do not evade taxes. The tax rate is set at the optimal level (A) =  and government
size is constant in A.
Proof: The only non-obvious point is that (A) increases in A in the intermediate stage.













Because ^ N(A) > 1= in the intermediate stage, the assumption that technological progress is
complementary to labor input, xA=x increasing in N, implies d=dA > 0. QED.
The predictions of Proposition 9 are illustrated in Figure 1. Following an early stage with
zero tax revenue and no public goods provision, the government gradually increases the tax rate
over the growth process until it reaches the dashed line in the gure after which government size
as a share of income is constant. This simple model captures the stylized facts regarding the
27evolution of taxes and government size over the process of economic development. Indeed, all
of the advanced economies in the world experienced a drastic increase in the size of government
to GDP during the 20th century when broad-based and third-party enforced taxes such as
individual income taxes, payroll taxes, and value-added-taxes were gradually implemented (see,
e.g., Webber and Wildavsky, 1986). In the last three-four decades, the size of government to
GDP has been roughly constant in the richest economies (OECD, 2008).
It is illuminating to compare our theoretical predictions to the empirical evidence by con-
sidering the historical evolution of taxation and government size in three dierent advanced
economies. Figure 2 (Panel A) displays the ratio of tax revenue (including all social security
contributions and all levels of government) to GDP in the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Sweden since the latter part of the 19th century. In all three countries, the tax ratio is
low (well below 10%) and very at until World War I, increases until around the late 1970s,
and then stays roughly constant thereafter. The exact timing of the tax increases and the nal
level of the ratio dier across countries. Most of the increase take place around the World Wars
in the United Kingdom. The United States also displays clear spikes around the World Wars,
although the tax ratio comes down to some extent after the wars. The increase in government
size is a lot smoother in Sweden, which was relatively unaected by the wars due to its status as
a neutral country. However, in all three countries and despite their dierent exposure to wars,
the stylized pattern of government growth is the same and ts very nicely with the theoretical
prediction shown in Figure 1. The case of Sweden is important to show that external shocks
and the ensuing ratchet eects are not necessary for the growth of government. Indeed, an
examination of all 30 OECD countries (OECD, 2008) shows that only Mexico and Turkey|the
two poorest OECD countries|have tax-to-GDP ratios below 25% in 2006, implying that the
growth of the tax-to-GDP ratio is universal among advanced economies.
Panel B decomposes the US tax ratio into incomes taxes (individual, corporate, and all pay-
roll taxes) and other taxes (property taxes, excise and sales taxes, custom duties, etc.). Income
taxes correspond roughly to modern taxes (based on business records, third-party reporting,
etc.), while other taxes are traditional taxes. Consistent with our theory, the graph shows
clearly that the secular growth in the tax ratio comes from income taxes, with only very modest
increases in other taxes. The US case is representative of other OECD countries where income
28and payroll taxes, along with the value-added tax,37 account for the bulk of government growth.
A more comprehensive analysis of tax ratios and composition over time and across countries is
left for future research. Finally, note that it is easy to extend our model to incorporate archaic
taxes by assuming that the government can raise a xed fraction 0 of national product through
such taxes. In that case, the theoretical path of taxes to GDP depicted on Figure 1 would be
shifted upward by 0 exactly as on Panel B in Figure 2.
4.4 Extensions
4.4.1 Endogenous Use of Business Records
Our analysis has assumed the existence of accurate business records (`books') that create poten-
tially detectable evidence of tax evasion. One way for a rm to escape taxation completely is to
discard the use of books altogether. As discussed in Section 3, being o-the-books is presumably
associated with a productivity loss that is growing in rm size and complexity, and rms choose
to be on or o books by trading o this productivity loss against the tax savings as in Gordon
and Li (2005). It is conceptually straightforward to set out a macro-economic model along these
lines, which generates results that are fully consistent with those presented above.
We assume that the average product of labor for a rm on the books is equal to x(N;A)(1   c),
where c is a xed administrative cost of maintaining books per unit of output and x has the
same properties as in the earlier model. Average productivity for a rm o-the-books equals
x(N;A)(N), where  reects the output loss of not having accurate business records. We
make the assumptions (0) = 1, 0 (N) < 0, and limN!1 (N) = 0.38 To zoom in on the im-
plications of endogenous books, we drop the agency model of third-party reporting, and assume
simply that a rm on the books is perfectly taxable while a rm o the books is completely
untaxable. All other components of the model (such as the specication of consumers and gov-
ernment) are exactly as before. In this setup and under some additional regularity assumptions,
it is possible to state a result analogous to Proposition 9 and with an evolution of government
size as in Figure 1. The mechanism that drives this development is no longer the increased
risk of third-party whistleblowing but rather an increased productivity gain of using rigorous
37The value-added-tax relies critically on accounting books and third party enforcement is obtained through
arm-length business-to-business transactions.
38In other words, not using books becomes prohibitively costly as technological progress grows. The results
easily extend to the case where limN!1 (N) =   > 0 as long as   1    =(1   c), i.e., the social optimal
tax rate is not too large.
29business records as rms get larger. The model and results are presented in appendix B.1.
4.4.2 Endogenous Growth
The above analysis of the development of tax enforcement and government size assumes that
productivity increases exogenously. This is a reasonable assumption if government activities
have only a limited impact on the growth process. However, some government activities, such
as the protection of property rights, law enforcement, and investments in education, health,
and infrastructure, may be very important for growth. Barro (1990) develops an endogenous
growth model where government inputs are complementary to private inputs in production, and
derives the optimal tax rate and government size along the growth process. It is possible to
embed a Barro-type production technology in our theory of tax enforcement, and obtain a model
where optimal rm size grows with endogenous technological progress. We present this model in
appendix B.2. The government applies a time varying tax rate to maximize the lifetime innite-
horizon utility of a representative household. Under some parameters, an economy might get
stuck in a poverty trap, because rms are too small and the government cannot raise income
taxes to feed the growth process. When the economy is not stuck in a poverty trap, there will
be three stages of development as in Proposition 9. First, the government cannot raise income
taxes and the economy grows too slowly relative to rst best. Second, the government starts
raising income taxes, but the tax rate is constrained by tax enforcement. The economy grows
faster but still slower than rst best. Third, the government is no longer constrained by tax
enforcement and can apply the tax rate that optimizes the growth rate. Thus, this endogenous
growth model delivers the same S-shaped time pattern of the tax-to-GDP ratio that ts the
empirical evidence. The model also suggests that the inability of some of the poorest countries
to start the growth process might be due to insucient scal capacity.39
5 Conclusion
Our paper has presented a simple agency model to explain why third-party income reporting by
employers can sustain tax enforcement in spite of low nes and low audit rates. Therefore, our
model overcomes the main shortcoming of the standard Allingham-Sandmo model of tax evasion.
39Economists have proposed many theoretical mechanisms that may generate poverty traps (see Azariadis and
Stachurski, 2005, for a survey). The public nance theory described above should be seen as complementary to
those alternative theories.
30The key mechanism that makes third-party tax enforcement successful is the combination of
veriable book evidence that is common knowledge within the rm and a large number of
employees, as any single employee can denounce collusive tax cheating between employees and
the employer by revealing true books to the government.40 Embedding this agency model into
the standard Allingham-Sandmo tax evasion model, we have shown that third-party reporting
improves tax enforcement if the government disallows self-reported losses or audits such losses
more stringently. We have argued that those ndings t very well with actual tax policy practices
and help explain the historical development of income taxation. We have also embedded this
agency model into a macro-economic growth model where the size and complexity of rms
grows with technological progress. Our simple model can capture the stylized fact that the
level of income taxes and the size of government to GDP grows during the process of economic
development. In our model, capitalistic development relaxes the tax enforcement constraint and
naturally leads to large welfare state governments.
Our analysis has been primarily theoretical. In future work, it would be valuable to test
some of the predictions of our model both in developed and developing countries.
Our theory predicts that third-party enforcement should be most successful for large and
complex rms. The related theories proposed by Gordon and Li (2005) and Kopczuk and
Slemrod (2006) point out that links to the nancial sector and the network of arm-length
transactions between rms (respectively) explain the success of modern taxes. We think that
both internal common knowledge (as in our model) and external arm-length transactions (as in
Kopczuk and Slemrod) produce veriable information that the government can exploit for tax
purposes. Hence, it is really the volume of recorded transactions (both internal and external)
that grows with economic development and increases the ability to tax. In principle, an empirical
analysis of tax audits of both rms and employees in a developed country could be used to assess
which factors|size and complexity, links to the nancial sector, network of transactions|
explains best the low levels of tax evasion observed in advanced OECD countries.
Our theory also predicts that the inability to collect income taxes from the informal sector
is the key reason why developing countries collect little tax revenue.41 Other theories have
40It is an intriguing question whether the development of automatic tax withholding and tax return free
systems could aect this mechanism as employees may no longer have to certify or even be aware of what
employers report to the government.
41The theory proposed by Gordon and Li (2005) makes the same prediction.
31been put forward: (1) corruption in the tax administration may make taxes hard to collect in
both the formal and informal sectors, (2) demand for government services may be lower in poor
countries. We could test our theory by estimating tax rates in the formal and informal sectors
of developing countries and comparing them with tax rates in OECD countries. Our theory
predicts that tax rates on the formal sector in developing countries should be high|possibly as
high as in OECD countries|while the alternative theories imply that even in the formal sector,
tax rates should be much lower in developing countries than in OECD countries.
A Appendix: Proofs for the A-S Model
Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose self-reported losses are disallowed to count against third-party reported income for tax
purposes. In this case, the taxpayer maximizes
(1   p)  u
 
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with respect to  ws. Now we have to distinguish explicitly between positive self-reporting ( ws >
0) and non-positive self-reporting ( ws  0). As losses are disallowed, individuals with non-
positive self-reporting ( ws  0) are indierent on how much losses to report, so we assume
without loss of generality that  ws = 0 in that case. Therefore  w+
s =  ws. Positive self-reporting
is optimal if the right-derivative of (9) is positive at  ws = 0, i.e. if
u0 (w   wt   w+
s )





which just corresponds to saying that the solution to the original problem was associated with
w > wt (i.e.,  ws > 0). If equation (10) holds, the maximization problems with symmetric versus
asymmetric treatment of gains and losses yield the same solutions, and third-party reporting
is irrelevant. In other words, third-party reporting on infra-marginal units of reported income
(increasing wt when wt < w) has no eect on  w. On other hand, once third-party reporting
starts digging into previously unreported income (increasing wt when wt  w), then  ws = 0
and the individual can no longer oset third party reporting. QED.
Proof of Proposition 7
The taxpayer maximizes
(1   p( ws))  u(w   (wt +  ws)) + p( ws)  u(w(1   )    (ws    ws)): (11)
32Denoting by cA and cN disposable income in the audit and no-audit states, the rst-order
condition for  ws is given by
p( ws)u
0 (cA)   p
0 ( ws)[u(cN)   u(cA)] = (1   p( ws))u
0 (cN); (12)
where the left-hand side is the gain of a higher report (the higher utility in the audited state
plus the lower probability of being in the audited state), while the right-hand side is the cost of
a higher report (the lower utility in the non-audited state).
Let us rewrite the rst-order condition (12) as
0 = R( ws;  w;w)  p( ws)u
0(cA)   (1   p( ws))u
0(cN)   p
0( ws)[u(cN)   u(cA)]; (13)
where cN = w     w and cA = w(1   )   (w    w) are functions of w and  w (and not of
 ws). Since  w =  ws + wt and the individual takes wt as xed, the second-order condition of the










Consider now a change in third-party reporting dwt keeping w constant such that dw = 0 and













@R=@  w + @R=@  ws
:
The denominator is negative from the second-order condition. Hence d  w=dwt > 0 if and only if







00( ws)[u(cN)   u(cA)] < 0;
where the inequality follows from p0( ws) < 0, p00( ws)  0, and cN  cA. QED.
33B Appendix: Extensions
B.1 Endogenous Use of Business Records
We assume that all rms have access to the same production technology. For each rm, the
average product of labor equals F(N;A;B), where N is the number of employees in the rm,
A is a technology parameter that grows exogenously over time, and B is an indicator variable
that equals 1 when the rm uses books and equals 0 otherwise. As in Section 4.4.1, we assume
F (N;A;B) =

x(N;A)(1   c) for B = 1
x(N;A)  (N) for B = 0 ;
where x(N;A) is increasing in A and inversely U-shaped in N (as in Section 4), c is a resource
cost in proportion of output of bookkeeping, while 1   (N) reects the output loss of not
using books. We assume that (0) = 1, N (N) < 0, and limN!1 (N) = 0.42 Let ^ N (A) =
argmaxx(N;A). As in Section 4, we assume that technological progress is complementary to
labor input, dened as xA (N;A)=x(N;A) being increasing in N. This implies that ^ N0 (A) > 0.
Moreover, we assume that, for all N,
lim
A!0
^ N (A) = 0; lim
A!1
^ N (A) = 1; lim
A!1
x(N;A)
x( ^ N (A);A)
= 0: (14)
Under those assumptions, we can prove:
Proposition 10 There are two cut-o levels AL < AH which determine three stages of devel-
opment:
(1) Early Stage: when A  AL, rms do not use books and the government cannot raise any
tax revenue and sets (A) = 0.
(2) Intermediate Stage: when AL < A < AH, the government is constrained by tax enforcement.
Firms use books and do not evade taxes. Government size is suboptimal, (A) < , and (A)
is increasing in A.
(3) Late Stage: when A  AH, the government is no longer constrained by tax enforcement and
rms do not evade taxes. The tax rate is set at the optimal level (A) =  and government
size (relative to total product) is constant in A.
42Note that the assumption limN!1 (N) = 0 does not necessarily imply that output vanishes for large N
since output equals x(N;A)  (N)  N.
34Proof: Firm prots  (N;A;B) are such that
 (N;A;0) = x(N;A)(N)N   yN; (15)




where y is the net-income that the rm has to oer its employees, while  is the tax rate on
earnings when using books. Prots are maximized with respect to N and B. The rst-order
conditions with respect to N equals
xN (N;A)N(N) + x(N;A)N (N)N + x(N;A)(N)   y = 0 for B = 0; (17)
[xN (N;A)N + x(N;A)](1   )(1   c)   y = 0 for B = 1: (18)
Let us denote by N(A;0) and N(A;1) the optimal choices for N given by (17) and (18).
There is free entry/exit of rms and labor is completely mobile across rms. This implies that
prots are zero in equilibrium. From the prot expressions (15) and (15), we get
y = x(N (A;0);A)  (N (A;0)) for B = 0; (19)
y = x(N (A;1);A)(1   )(1   c) for B = 1: (20)
Using these two expressions, the rst-order conditions (17) and (18) simplify to
xN (N (A;0);A)(N (A;0)) + x(N (A;0);A)N (N (A;0)) = 0 for B = 0; (21)
xN (N (A;1);A) = 0 for B = 1: (22)
Comparing these two expressions, we see that a rm with books will choose more employees
than a rm without books:
N(A;1) > N(A;0): (23)
Lemma 1 Our assumption of complementarity implies
dN(A;B)
dA
> 0 for B = 0;1:







which is positive because of the assumption of complementarity and because x(N;A) is inversely
U-shaped in N.
35For B = 0, the rst-order condition (21) is
(A;N (0)) = xN (N (0);A)(N (0)) + x(N (0);A)N (N (0)) = 0: (24)







where N (A;N (0)) < 0 because of the second-order condition. This implies
sign[dN (0)=dA] = sign[A (A;N (0))]:
From (24), we have
A (A;N (0)) = xNA (N (0);A)(N (0)) + xA (N (0);A)N (N (0));
where we have used the Envelope Theorem. By inserting (24), we see that
sign[A (A;N (0))] = sign

xNA (N (0);A)  




which is positive because of the complementarity assumption xA (N;A)=x(N;A) increasing in
N. QED.
In equilibrium, rms that oer the highest wages survive. Hence, rms will use books if this
implies that they can oer higher wages to the employees. From equations (19) and (20), the
condition for using books becomes







As long as  is less than the Samuelson tax rate , the government will be constrained by the
above condition. Let ^  (A) denote the highest enforceable tax rate of the government. Then







By log-dierentiating this expression and using the envelope theorem, we obtain
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The assumption of complementarity, xA (N;A)=x(N;A) increasing in N, ensures that the con-

















36where we have used that limA!0 ^ N (A) = 0 ) limA!0 N (A;1) = 0 implying that limA!0 N (A;0) =
0 because of (23). In addition, we have used that limA!1 ^ N (A) = 1 implies limA!1 N (A;1) =
1. Thus, either limA!1 N (A;0) = constant in which case the assumption limA!1
x(N;A)
x( ^ N(A);A) = 0
ensures the last result or limA!1 N (A;0) = 1 in which case limN!1 (N) = 0 ensures the
last result.
The limits in (27) and the result ^ 0 (A) > 0 imply that there exist AL and AH such that the
proposition is satised. In particular, when AL  A  AH, the government sets (A) = ^ (A)
given by equation (26). QED.
B.2 Endogenous Growth Model
B.2.1 Households









where c is instantaneous individual consumption (we drop time subscripts for expositional sim-
plicity),  > 0 is the rate of time preference, and  > 0 is the coecient of relative risk aversion.
We assume that each household supplies inelastically one unit of labor. The ow-budget con-
straint equals
_ k = rk + (1   t)w   T   c; (29)
where k is the capital stock, r is the net-return on savings, w is the pre-tax labor income, t
is a tax rate on labor income, while T is a lump sum tax. We assume that the lump sum
instrument is restricted T  y where  is the maximum fraction of aggregate income y that
the government can collect in lump sum taxes. We introduce lump sum taxes so that the
government can raise revenue in all stages of economic development as government spending is
essential for economic prosperity as we shall see below. Our empirical analysis in Figure 2 shows
indeed that governments were able to raise a modest fraction of GDP in taxes before modern
income and value added taxes became enforceable. Maximization of (28) subject to (29) and a








37B.2.2 Firms and Productivity
We assume that all rms have access to the same production technology and we assume that
all markets are perfectly competitive. The output of rm i is given by











where ni is the number of employees in the rm, ki is the size of the rm's capital stock, g is
aggregate government spending, k is the aggregate capital stock in the economy. We assume that
x() is inversely U-shaped with a maximum at ni = ^ n(k) in which case we have x0 (1) = 0 and
x(1)  1. Therefore, ^ n(k) is the optimal rm size/number of employees in the rm. Ignoring the
x(:) function, notice that f (ni;ki;g;k) is homogenous of degree one in the reproducible factors
of production k and g and is homogenous of degree one in ni and ki. These two homogeneity
assumptions are common in the endogenous growth literature.
Moreover, we assume that capital and rm size are complementary, ^ n0 (k) > 0, reecting
that the workforce needs to organize in larger rms in order to reap the full return of a larger
capital stock. Importantly, we assume for simplicity of exposition that the optimal rm's size
depends on the aggregate capital stock k and not on the rm's specic capital stock ki. Finally,
note that the capital stock of each rm is negligible compared to the aggregate capital stock as
there is a continuum of rms. In a symmetric equilibrium, each rm employs n workers. There
is therefore a continuum of rms of measure 1=n (as there is a continuum of workers of measure
one). Each rm employs ki = nk units of capital where k is the aggregate capital stock. Hence,











which shows that aggregate output is maximized when rm size n equals ^ n(k).











i   rki   wni: (33)

















i   w = 0;
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@ki







































Free entry and exit ensures that prots are zero therefore entry/exit will occur until ni = ^ n(k)
such that x0 (1) = 0.







r = (1   )g
k
  (38)
where we have used equations (32), (34), (35), and ni = ^ n(k). Note that the standard macro-
economic equation y = w + rk holds.
B.2.3 Optimal Government Policy
Case with No Tax Evasion
We consider a benevolent government that chooses (g;T;t) in order to maximize lifetime
utility (28). The government policy has to satisfy the government budget constraint
g  T + tw: (39)




From equations (29), and (39) and (40), we obtain the resource constraint
_ k = g
k
1    g   c = 

1 k   g   c: (41)
From equations (30) and (33), we obtain the steady state growth rate of consumption for a











39which also becomes the steady state growth rate of k and y. The marginal benet of raising
public spending is g 1k1  = (g=k)
 1 while the marginal cost is 1. This, together with
equation (40), implies that the optimal policy solution that decentralizes the rst best allocation







which is constant over time.43
Case with Full Tax Evasion
With full tax evasion, it is impossible to tax income, t = 0. We now haveg = T  y. We
assume  <  implying that it is impossible to attain the optimal government-to-GDP ratio












Case with Tax Enforcement
We consider the whistleblower model of tax evasion. We denote by  y the net-of-tax income
of each employee in his best outside option, where  y is determined by the equilibrium in the
labor market and taken as given by the rm. The rm then has to oer each employee a pre-tax
compensation equal to  y=(1   t) if it complies with the tax law, and equal to  y if it evades all
taxes.
If the rm evades and nobody whistleblows, the income of each employee is given by w =  y.
If an employee decides to whistleblow (given that nobody else does), he can obtain income
 y   (1 + ) y + (1 + ) yni. The employee is therefore prevented from whistleblowing i
 y   y   (1 + ) y + (1 + ) yni, which is equivalent to ni  1= as in Proposition 4. Hence,
a rm that evades tax has to choose a rm size ni below 1=. We can prove the following
Proposition:
Proposition 11 Let  n  1=. We obtain the following cases:
(1) If ^ n(k)   n, then the rm evades all taxes and chooses the optimal rm size ^ n(k).
43We assume (1   )

1  >  > (1   )

1  (1   ), where the rst inequality ensures a positive growth
rate while the second inequality ensures that utility is bounded.
40(2) If ^ n(k) >  n then:






, the rm evades all taxes and chooses suboptimal rm size  n.






, the rm does not evade and chooses the optimal rm size ^ n(k).
Proof: Without tax evasion, ni = ^ n(k) is optimal and the pre-tax wage rate as a function of
the capital stock is given by equation (37) such that w =   g  (k=g)1 . The capital stock as





 g. By inserting
this expression, in equation (37), we obtain







Taxation is sustainable if a single rm cannot achieve a higher prot by cheating. Since, prot














i   rki    yni  0:
If ^ n(k) >  n, then the optimal size choice for the evading rm is ni =  n. In that case, the optimal








   r = 0:
















 n  0:















 n  0;
which is fullled if







Using the same procedure, it is possible to show the reverse result, i.e., starting from an evasion







41The proof of (1) follows from the fact that prots are always greater under evasion when
this can be sustained at the optimal rm size ^ n(k). The proof of (2a) and (2b) follows directly
from the above argument and the condition (46). QED.
Macroeconomic Development
We now characterize the optimal government policy and the macroeconomic development of
the economy. Let us denote by k the aggregate capital stock that solves ^ n(k) =  n  1=, and





 = = < 1. As ^ n
  k

>  n, we have k <  k.
We consider an economy with an initial capital stock below k. We have
Proposition 12 Optimal government policy and possible stages of economic development




 then the government cannot raise income taxes and the
economy will experience negative growth.





(a) First stage (underdeveloped economy): When k < k, the government cannot raise
any tax revenue. The growth rate of the economy is positive but too low compared to
the rst-best growth rate.
(b) Intermediate stage: When k  k   k , the government is constrained by tax enforce-






. Firms do not evade taxes but government size is
suboptimal ( < ). The growth rate of the economy is positive and increasing but
too low compared to the rst-best growth rate.
(c) Last stage (modern economy): When k >  k , the government is no longer constrained
by tax enforcement, rms do not evade taxes, government size is socially optimal
( = ), and the growth rate of the economy equals the the rst-best growth rate.





 , then equation (44) implies that the growth rate is negative. In that case,
the economy is stuck in a poverty trap which proves (1).




 , then equation (44) implies that the growth rate is
positive. As  < , the growth rate is lower than the rst best growth rate given by (43) which
proves (2a).
42As the economy has a positive growth rate, k will eventually reach k and Proposition 11,






can be enforced, which proves (2b).
Eventually, k will reach  k at which point the rst best tax rate  =  can be enforced and
the growth rate becomes rst best optimal which proves (2c). QED.
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Evolution of Tax Revenue to GDP in Three Advanced Economies
Sources: United States: 1902-1995 from the Historical Statistics of the United States, 1996-present from the
annual Statistical Abstracts of the United States. Series have been compiled with interpolations for some
missing years in the period 1902-1949 by Christopher Chantrill at http://www.usgovernmentrevenue.com/
United Kingdom and Sweden: 1868-1964 from Flora (1983). 1965-present from OECD, Tax Revenue Statistics
and GDP Statistics.
Notes: In panel A, taxes include taxes from all levels of government (central, state, and local). Taxes include
social security contributions. We have used series from Flora et al. for general tax revenue (as a percent) of
GDP and adding social security receipts paid by employees and employers. Period 1965-present, we use total
tax revenue from OECD tax statistics, GDP series are from OECD, National Income Statistics. In panel B,
income taxes include the individual and corporate federal and state income taxes, all payroll taxes financing
social insurance programs. Other taxes include all other taxes (primarily property taxes, sales taxes, excise
taxes, custom duties, estate and inheritance taxes, and various other small taxes).




























































































B. Evolution of income vs. other taxes in the US, 1902-2008
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